A psychosocial risk at the workplace is a well-researched subject from a managerial and organizational point of view. However, the relation of psychosocial risks to Information Security has not been formally studied to the extent required by the gravity of the topic. An attempt is made to highlight the nature of psychosocial risks and provide examples of their effects on Information Security. The foundation is thus set for methodologies of assessment and mitigation and suggestions are made on future research directions.
Introduction
It has been well established in the standard literature that major vulnerabilities of Information Systems can be attributed to their human element, i.e. the users. When these users are themselves targeted, the compromise of information security becomes imminent, irrespective of technical measures that strengthen information security as well as physical security. In previous work, it was shown that there are many human psyche aspects that attackers can use effectively against any user they set their sights on (Frangopoulos et al., 2010) . Social aspects of Information Security were also examined (Frangopoulos et al., 2008) and their significance in successful attacks was discussed. In addition to breaches caused by such attacks, one must also not overlook those insider security incidents that are caused deliberately or accidentally, where due to user action, negligence, fault or oversight, information security is ultimately compromised. This again has to do with the fact that Information System users are humans with individual abilities and shortcomings that cannot be categorized and dealt with in bulk from an Information Security point of view. In this context, even though "to err is human", when these errors -deliberate or not-are aggravated by psychosocial factors, there may be dire consequences on Information Security. Hence, ways must be found to reduce such occurrences by ensuring that the causal factors of psychosocial risks that are inevitably present in any modern organization are effectively controlled.
Social sciences have been dealing with the field of psychosocial risk mitigation for many years and no course in business management disciplines can be deemed complete without proper reference to this issue. The obvious conclusion is thus that if psychosocial factors affect all forms of business operations and a clear concern exists on how to control these factors and reduce their adverse effects, then it is only reasonable to assume that t h e security of Information Systems, viewed from this angle, is also exposed to risks of a psychosocial nature. This paper identifies psychosocial risks that affect Information Security, shows how this effect comes about and suggests ways and research directions for the assessment and mitigation of such risks.
Background
The term "Psychosocial" itself has two components: "Psyche" which pertains to one's own psychological predispositions and "Social" which has to do with external factors, stemming from the role of the individual in society and the interaction with others. By combining the two notions into one term and using it to describe risk, the emphasis is placed on those risks that result from the individual's own perceptions and psyche as he/she reacts to stimuli from his/her societal environment.
The currently prevailing notion of system security from a systems engineering perspective, as presented by Larson et al. (2009, p.114) , is that system security (along with system safety) is yet another design constraint which "relates to attributes t h a t e n a b l e t h e s y s t e m to c o m p l y w i t h regulations and standards". Clearly, by adding the intricate parameter of Psychosocial Risk into the equation of Information Systems security, the above notion becomes insufficient. This, however, does not mean that, in designing a more secure system, one has to do away with standards and start from scratch. The standards are there and should be followed as they provide commonly acceptable and effective solutions to a number of different security problems. In a holistic approach to the Information Security issue however, standards should be complemented by those techniques and practices that mitigate risks of a psychosocial nature. In such a holistic approach, the people and their individual characteristics cannot be ignored. Designing secure Information Systems and applications becomes a much more intricate exercise when the individual problems of potential users that may affect Information Security need to be pro-actively addressed. In Bruce Schneier's own words: "...the mathematics are impeccable, computers are vincible, the networks are lousy and the people are abysmal. I've learned a lot about the problems of securing computers and networks, but none that really helps solve the people problem" (Schneier, 2004, p.255) .
Barring a handful of researchers such as Greitzer et al. (2010; 2010a; and Vyhmeister et al. (2006) who deal with psychosocial risks in the particular context of Information Security, limited work has been done in this direction. Hence, it would be prudent to set the ground for the current work by examining the idea of psychosocial risks (or "psychosocial hazards" -the two terms seem to be used without distinction in the literature) from the usual managerial and organizational points of view, where extensive research has been and is being carried out. The International Labour Organization defines "psychological factors" in terms of the interactions between employee's skills and needs on one side, and job content, work organization, work management and environmental and organisational conditions, on the other. In this context, "psychosocial hazards" refer to those of the above interactions that have a hazardous influence over employees' health, through the employees' perceptions and experience (ILO, 1986) . Cox (1993) considers that psychosocial hazards may have a direct or indirect adverse effect on both psychological and physical health, through the experience of stress. In a more recent work, he presents a definition for psychosocial hazards as "those aspects of the design and management of work, and its social and organisational contexts, that have the potential for causing psychological or physical harm" (Cox et al., 2003, p.195) . Haubold (2008, p.7) defines "psychosocial risks" as the human tensions potentially generated by the application of enterprise strategy. She continues by identifying some of these tensions as stress, the impression of being harassed, violence (in all forms), mental burden etc. In the same text, the author lists a few positions on psychosocial risks adopted by respected researchers in the field, which are included here in order to set the foundation for further discussion:
1. Employee satisfaction determines employee punctuality or absence (Spector, 1997, p.104 ). 2. Half of the days of absence from work are due to a problematic work environment or stress (Cooper, 1994) . 3. Personnel involvement is associated with low running costs and high performance (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990 ). 4. Employee satisfaction is directly related to client satisfaction (Heskett et al., 1997, p .320) 5. Job satisfaction is founded on personnel involvement. (Vandenberg et al., 1999) 6. Employee satisfaction stemming from job security, compensation and satisfaction in general are directly related to the financial performance of the enterprise. (Schneider et al., 2003) One has to bear in mind that the above statements view psychosocial risks from a business management angle but, nevertheless, conclusions can be drawn for the research at hand. It is immediately visible though, that if steps are taken to minimize psychosocial risks and keep employees happy, the enterprise benefits.
In order to further highlight the gravity of psychosocial risks, it suffices to mention that according to the European Agency for Health and Safety at Work, one third of the European worker population (i.e. more than 40 million people) report that they are affected by stress at work (EASHW, 2002) . On this basis, psychosocial risks are currently recognized as a major challenge to occupational health and safety (EASHW, 2007) . In 2007, 13.6% of all workers who responded to surveys carried out in the U.K. by the Health & Safety Executive, when asked to rate how stressful they felt their job was, reported that they found their job either very or extremely stressful (Webster, 2007) . From these three statements, in conjunction to the list of accepted positions regarding psychological risks above, it becomes evident that, up to one third of an enterprise's workforce, could conceivably pose a significant threat to the enterprise's prosperity because of exposure to psychosocial risks.
It is interesting to note that from a managerial and organisational point of view, the issue of psychological risks at the workplace is well-established and well-researched. Furthermore, its importance to the well-being of the organization is highlighted. However, from the extensive bibliographical research carried out in the course of the present work, only a handful of publications were found to relate psychosocial risks with Information Security in general, and the security of Information Systems in particular. It seems that even though some effort is invested on the general human aspect of Information Security, only a small group of scientists, primarily led by Greitzer, investigates psychosocial risks as a significant factor of Information Security in an effort to mitigate insider threat (Greitzer et al., 2010; 2010a; . The conclusion to be drawn is hence that Psychosocial Risks, being such an important factor in the general well-being of an enterprise, can and must not be ignored in the context of Information Security.
Common causes and general effects of psychosocial risks
Irrespective of the nature of the effects of Psychosocial Risks on the various aspects of an enterprise's prosperity, the causes of Psychosocial Risks have been thoroughly investigated in the past. Even though new causes may appear as society and technology progress, there already is a well-defined foundation that can work as the basis for the scope of this paper.
The International Labour Organization in its invitation to "The New SOLVE" conference (ILO, 2011), lists the following among factors which place high emotional demands at work and contribute to work-related stress: According to Brun (2003) , the psychosocial risks at work can be attributed to events taking place in the private life of the individual, in the organization where he/she works or in the society in which he functions and progresses. Other lists of causes of psychosocial risks were also found during the relevant research, but, generally speaking, they revolve around the same themes as above. A detailed comparative description of such causes lies beyond the scope of this work and the interested reader is directed towards the bibliography presented in the references section of this paper. It is noteworthy that as the design of Information Systems influences job design and workflow, management practices, organizational policy and other issues, it may itself constitute a causal factor of psychological distress (Vyhmeister, 2006) As expected, any of the above may lead to errors, reduction in productivity and sick-leave. Other outcomes are diminished job-satisfaction and commitment, generally unsafe behaviour at the workplace and an increased propensity for accidents (Cooper et al., 1997) . To make matters worse, many of these issues are interrelated and often co-exist (Probst et al., 2008) .
Effects on information security
Having established the gravity of the general effects of psychosocial risks, given that the people who are subject to these may be the users of information systems and thus the handlers of information, it becomes evident that Information Security is directly affected.
Whether intentional or by accident, breaches of Information Security in this context fall under the general category of "insider threat". The person directly or indirectly responsible for such a breach, is by definition an employee of the organization who, out of malice or because of plain disregard for Information Security rules, allows information to be compromised.
According to recent data breach studies, insiders may directly or indirectly be behind a significant percentage of breaches, whether intentional or not (Verizon, 2009; 2010; . The reported insider threat percentages varied from 17% to 48% of all data breach cases that were studied in the three-year period from 2009 to 2011. The significant fluctuation in the obtained percentages is due to the nature and total volume of the data breach cases examined each year (Verizon, 2011). However, even at the minimum level of 17%, insider threat is still quite substantial and must be examined, analyzed and controlled.
In this context, an employee experiencing diminished job satisfaction becomes less committed to the organization or enterprise he/she works for and may use the enterprise's confidential information as a bargaining chip for alternate employment by a competitor, or, simply, for monetary gain. For an employee who has become indifferent to his/her work, it will be very difficult to go through the sometimes tedious processes to ensure Information Security. Hence, when shortcuts are taken and security rules are not followed, information becomes liable to compromise. For those users afflicted by the physically debilitating consequences listed in table 1, it becomes evident that the employee's judgement may become erratic and accidents will inevitably follow. Insofar Information Security is concerned, accidents such as using an insecure channel to distribute sensitive information can be detrimental.
In order for Information Security policies to be effective, the co-operation of end-users is of paramount importance. When the end-users' abilities and will to co-operate towards better Information Security are curtailed as a direct effect of psychosocial risks, Information Security policies are bound to fail in some degree. It has already been shown that Social Engineering attacks play a major role in Information Security (Frangopoulos, 2007) . In order to withstand such an attack, the end-user must be in a state of alertness. This state is impossible to attain under the light of most of the consequences of psychosocial risks listed in table 1.
In order to deal with attacks against Information Security in a centralized way, it is important to have an incident co-ordination and response centre. This centre relies on information from automated systems such as Intrusion Detection Systems and analyses of system log files. In addition to that, an important contribution comes in the form of feedback on attacks (even attempted ones) received from users. Hence, if the users' ability to contribute in this manner is impeded, the centre's function will be inherently limited.
Poor man-machine interface design on an otherwise secure information system or application may also lead to the compromise of Information Security. The users affected by psychosocial factors, who are already burdened by the interface's bad design and the required time-consuming sequences of actions, when they find themselves pressed for time due to a pending deadline, may opt for a less time and effort-consuming solution, albeit an insecure one.
These few and non-exhaustive examples show how psychosocial risks affect the users of Information Systems and consequently, Information Security. Irrespective of the level of security incorporated in systems and policies, the responsibility for Information Security largely lies with the enduser who has already been established as the weak link in the Information Security chain. When the user's abilities and will to protect the information he/she handles have been reduced by psychosocial factors, this information will inevitably be at peril. Hence, even though the user will always be expected to comply with policy requirements, every effort must be made to ensure that he/she is not hindered by psychosocial factors in doing so.
Proposed methods of assessment and mitigation -future work
By the discussion so far it should be clear that technological "add-ons" cannot solve all of the Information Security problems of an organization upon deployment, as Information Security has to also address people issues and organisational aspects. To achieve this goal, all aspects of Information Systems and organisational issues must be designed or re-designed with Information Security as an element of the design process. Existing systems, applications and the complete information lifecycle must be re-examined, bearing in mind plausible Information Security principles.
There is little point in allowing psychosocial risks to go unchecked and then attempting to counteract their effects. This would be equivalent to treating the symptoms of a disease and not the disease itself. The best approach is to try and pro-actively diminish the psychosocial risks in the first place. To this end ILO provides detailed and up-to-date instructions (ILO, 1998; 2012) . In order to be reduced, the psychosocial risks must first be identified and assessed. Following identification, the evaluation of psychosocial risks need not be obtained in absolute terms. It is more practical to obtain a base-line assessment of the situation at a given point in time and re-evaluate, after steps are taken towards psychosocial risk mitigation. Mitigation will take place by designing proper processes to this effect and incorporating appropriate controls. The virtuous cycle of perpetual re-assessment in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls has to be repeated periodically.
As this is both a tedious method to design and follow and expensive in terms of resources, senior management commitment is of paramount importance. To obtain such a commitment may be easier said than done, as described by Gagné et al. (2008, p.73) : "all other IT activities are perceived more as enabling the business to do their work, where security is the one group that is perceived as the opposite". The assessment can take place using two methods:
surveillance and questionnaires (Dollard, 2007) . Surveillance relies on obtaining statistical data from sources like the Human Resources and Health departments of an organization regarding personnel absences, complaints, decreased departmental efficiency, common ailments etc. Questionnaires can be based on 5-point balanced Likert scale structures (Likert, 1974) with gradations from "Not at all stressful" to "Extremely stressful" or "Very happy" to "Very unhappy" depending on the question subject. Also depending on the question subject, other forms of questionnaires may be used (Friedman and Amoo, 1999) . The questionnaires having the capacity for much more accurate targeting of the effect of psychosocial risks on the security of Information Systems, they would be preferable to any other method of assessment that, nevertheless, can still be used to complement the questionnaire-based survey results and/or guide questionnaire design. This will be one of the topics of further research in this field.
A detailed examination of psychosocial risk mitigation being beyond the scope of this paper, future research in this area will be based on (among other sources) the work of Greitzer et al. (2010; 2010a; on combining psychosocial data with traditional cyber-security data and modelling towards insider-threat mitigation; on the work of Da Veiga and Eloff (2010) for Information Security culture assessment; on the writings of Vyhmeister et al. (2006) for risk assessment with respect to the implementation of information and communication systems; on Trompeter and Eloff (2001) for the implementation of socio-ethical controls in Information Security and on the works of Carlotto (2010) and Cifre et al. (2004) that deal with information technology-induced psychosocial risks and tools for their assessment.
Conclusions
In this paper, two existing research areas, that of psychosocial risk identification and management and that of Information Security, both wellresearched in their own right, are brought together. Combining the two areas in research may bring us closer to an answer to the question of why Information Security fails when all prescribed measures and controls are in place and active. It may help us better understand the specificities of the effects of human nature on Information Security and in doing so, ameliorate the general environment in which humans are called upon to function in a secure manner. It may also help set a new paradigm on what constitutes a "reasonable request" from human operators of an information system when they are asked to uphold Information Security. Under this light and through a virtuous cycle of survey and re-assessment using specially constructed questionnaires, the real effect of psychosocial risks on Information Security will be established.
